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(In Collaboration with Paul Thorp and Edward R. Holland)
INTRODUCTION
T HE doctrine of mutations has a very important place in the
community property law of Texas. Having no basis other
than case law, the doctrine got a very early start in the Texas
decisions as a result of its adoption from the Civil Law of Spain
and Mexico.'
The effect of the mutations doctrine is to maintain the separate
estates of the respective spouses intact throughout the marriage.
The most important requirement in so doing is tracing the original
separate property through its various changes and mutations to
its present condition.2
Mutations is applied with uniformity, whether the property
involved is separate or community. This has not always been true
in the case of choses in action, which have not always been re-
cognized as property.
The doctrine is constitutional as applied to the wife's separate
property, though the constitution's rigid definition' of such prop-
erty includes only premarital property and property acquired
during marriage by gift, devise, and descent. Property acquired
*Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPEzTY, § 77 (1943); 2 Id. §§ 142
and 186.
2 Jones v. Epperson, 69 Tex. 586, 7 S. W. 488 (1888).
Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851).
King v. Gilleland, 60 Tex. 271 (1883).
3 Martin v. McAllister. 94 Tex. 567. 63 S. W. 624 (1901).
4 Thx. CONST. art. 16. § 15.
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during marriage in exchange for such property does not come
literally within the definition; but it is viewed as being such origi-
nal property in a different guise or in a changed form.
MUTATIONS-APPLIED IN CONTRASTING SPOUSE'S PROFITS FROM
BUSINESS WITH SPOUSE'S ISOLATED PURCHASES AND SALES
Here the problem seems to resolve into one of public policy.
The courts have been endeavoring to preserve and protect the
separate estate of each spouse; they have also been attempting
to make the attentions and labors of the spouses inure to the
benefit of the community as far as is practicable. The former
goal would be reached perfectly by applying the mutations prin-
ciple uniformly to all purchases and exchanges made with separate
property; the latter endeavor restricts the use of the mutations
principle and would, if carried to the extreme, substitute a theory
,hat would make almost any gain in the value of the separate
estates, the property of the community when realized. It appears
safe to say that if the property is clearly separate and if the sale
is an isolated one (that is, free of any tinge of a sale for profit
and prompt reinvestment), the mutations doctrine will be applied,
and the funds or other property received from the sale will also
be separate property.6 It also appears safe to say that if a spouse
is engaged in the business of buying and selling property, the
profits become the property of the community.' Between these
two extremes the rule is clouded, and conjecture as to the out-
come of any case is beset with uncertainty.
The reason for the mutations rule is a simple one: the law of
community property recognizes the separate estates of the spouses;
therefore if the mutations rule were not applied, the spouses would
have to maintain their separate estates in specie in order to main-
5 Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535. 273 S. W. 799 (1925).
6 Rose v. Houston. 11 Tex. 323 (1854).
7 Richards Medicine Co. v. Jennings, 283 S. W. 296, (Tex. Civ. App., 1926), writ of
error dismissed; Epperson v. Jones, 65 Tex. 425 (1886).
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tain them at all. There would be no valid reason for a rule that
would place such a restraint on alienation by making it fatal to
their separate property rights.
The reason for the opposing rule is equally as simple. It is that
the spouses should not use their labor, time, and attention, which
should inure to the benefit of the favored community, for the
benefit of the recognized, but subordinate, separate estates.
Two reasons seem to underlie the rule that the profits of a
mercantile business are community property, even though the
business is carried on with a spouse's separate funds.' First, there
are numerous sales and purchases, requiring much community
labor and supervision; second, tracing the original separate prop-
erty through its many mutations is extremely difficult, and where
tracing fails, the community presumption prevails. Therefore, the
value of the initial separate property is considered the corpus,
which remains separate property; and any increase in value is
community profit.
An isolated sale where gain is realized could be analyzed as
corpus and profit, but the aforesaid reasons do not exist: commu-
nity labor is relatively slight and tracing is easy.
Such mercantile business was contrasted with an investment of
the wife's separate money (by the husband, with her consent)
in land, which increased in value and was sold for a net gain,
the proceeds then being reinvested in land and this process being
repeated through a period of half a dozen years? The increased
value was held to be the wife's separate property, in spite of
the great amount of community attention required in procuring
purchasers and writing deeds. It is extremely probable that the
opposite result would be reached today; two principal bases of
the decision have been changed, viz., "increase of land" is now
considered as probably meaningless," in that probably no prop-
s Brittain v. O'Banion, 56 S. W. (2d) 249, (Tex. Civ. App., 1933), writ of error
dismissed; Schwethelm v. Schwethelm, 1 S. W. (2d) 911, (Tex. Civ. App., 1927).
9 Evans v. Purinton, 34 S. W. 350, (Tex. Civ. App., 1896), writ of error refused.
10 Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S. W. 799 (1925) ; see 23 Tex. Jur., Hus-
band and Wife, § 52; Willcutt v. Willcutt, 278 S. W. 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
1950]
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erty is separate property which would not be if the phrase were
excised from the statutes" and the husband no longer manages
the wife's separate property.
Judge Speer, in his Marital Rights, Section 367, emphasizes
the 'intention of the spouse in the transaction as being the main
factor; that is, whether the purchase of the item was to obtain
profit or to obtain a permanent acquisition. (Doubtless, where
the latter intent exists at the time of purchase, the item need not
be permanently retained; the spouse can certainly change his or
her mind.) He adds that there can be no distinction as to the type
of property involved, except that it might shed light on the inten-
tion of the spouse with respect to the purchase. If the intention
were an "enterprise," then the gain upon sale would represent
the profit of the enterprise and become community property. If
the intention were a permanent acquisition, then the gain upon
later sale would be merely the enhancement of the property in the
spouse's hands, and this gain would be separate property. Thus,
for example, the contemplation of only a single transaction rather
than repeated purchases and sales with separate funds would
make an application of the mutations rule clearly correct. Judge
Speer also warns that in order to protect the spouse's (particularly
the wife's) separate estate, there must be a limit to the theory
which makes the slightest attention on her part fatal to her right
to the increase in value of her separate property.
Of course, the situation is very different when separate property
is not sold but is retained. This latter topic is not really within
the sphere of the mutations principle, and will be treated only
cursorily. Comunity labor (including attention and supervision)
in improving such separate property does not ordinarily affect
the title, which remains separate. For example, increase in value
of the wife's livestock due to the husband's good care belongs to
the wife separately. 2 Community labor in producing a product
11 TE. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 4613 and 4614.
12 Howard v. York, 20 Tex. 670 :(1858); Stringfellow v. Sorrels, 82 Tex. 277, 18
S. W. 689 (1891). ' I
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from separate property will not change the title to that property,
but the product will be community property--e.g., crops from
separate land-apparently even though the community labor
amounts to no more than slight supervision.'" The result is accen-
tuated by using community labor, directly or through employing
agents, to sever the product.
The foregoing rules as to the effect of community labor seem
to strike a good balance between the two policies enunciated supra
(protecting the separate estates and giving the community the
benefit of community labor). If separate property is sold, an
increased value received in exchange will be separate property,
unless there are enough sales to constitute a business, in which
case the profit will be community property. If separate property
is retained, its increased value, whether due to impersonal forces
or to community labor, is separate property; its products (unless
existing without community labor-e.g., natural grass) are com-
munity property.
In summary of the mutation principle's application here, the
property in question must be traced with certainty from its present
condition through all of its mutations and changes to its source
as separate property in order that its original separate character
may now be maintained. If the fact situations warrant, the con-
cept of a business, the intention of the spouse in purchasing the
property, and the degree of community time, labor, and attention
spent in selling the property may tip the scale for the favored
community estate.
MUTATIONS-As APPLIED TO LOTTERY TICKETS
One interesting Supreme Court case raises this problem." A
wife bought a lottery ticket for $1, her separate money, and
is Cleveland v. Cole, 65 Tex. 405 (1886) ; compare Craxton, Wood & Co. v. Ryan,
3 Will Civ. Case App. § 367, (1888) and White v. Lynch, 26 Tex. 195 (1862), where
timber and hay were severed and then processed.
14 Dixon v. Sanderson, 72 Te. 359 (1888).
1950]
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drew the prize of $15,000. Was the money hers separately, or
was it community property?
The mutations rule would yield a very simple result. Since she
bought the ticket and the contract right it represented with her
separate money, they would clearly be her separate property.
Her chose in action was highly contingent, but upon the happen-
ing of the contingency, it became a very solid right to the prize;
it became immaterial that there ever was an "if" in the bargain.
This contract right was a right to the prize money; it was that
and nothing more.. Therefore when the ticket was cashed, the
prize should be her separate property. The transaction is even
more closely knit than the ordinary mutations situation, and there.
fore should a fortiori reach the above result. Here there was, in
a sense, a mutation, but it was more than that; it was not an in-
dependent, later conceived exchange, but really a part of the
contract right, viz., its performance.
This, however, is not the result reached in the above-cited case.
The court stated the constitutional definition of the wife's separate
property as that acquired before marriage and that acquired after
marriage by gift, devise, or d-scent. The prize was acquired after
marriage; therefore the court concluded that the prize must be
a gift, a devise, or an inheritance in order to be her separate
property. The court of course denied that it was any of these,
and held that the prize was community property. In disposing of
the mutations theory, the court recognized that when "property
purchased or taken in exchange increases in value, this neces-
sarily inures to the benefit of the owner," but continued: "Such
a state of fact, however, is not before us, and we are constrained
to hold that all profit realized on the purchase of the lottery ticket
became community property."
However, "profit" seems not to be involved. Profit arises when
there is a business-when property is kept and used to make
money, or is sold and resold many times. A single purchase, as
here, is surely not a business. The wife bought a contract right,
[Vol. IV
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which proved to be surprisingly valuable; is there any substan-
tial difference between that and buying seemingly worthless land
as a long-shot oil investment and having it later produce oil?
The court may have been influenced by the overshadowing
element of speculation, which Judge Speer says will make the
proceeds community property, 5 on the basis that a large gain
was sought. Of course, conservative investments (e.g., buying
suburban land-which if bought with separate money is separate
property regardless of how it rises in value) are made for the
sake of gain also; is there a major legal difference between the
gain sought in one conservative investment and the gain sought
in one speculative purchase? It would not seem so. Furthermore,
holding the lottery proceeds to be community property would
seem to require a holding that the contract right (and the ticket)
were at the instant of spending the $1 of separate money therefor,
community property-a result somewhat difficult to justify. More-
over, the court does not mention the word "speculation" or any
synonym for it, and makes no argument as to illegality or as to
the public policy against lotteries. The oil situation just men-
tioned is equally speculative and so are many stock market tran-
sactions; here where there is no adverse public policy involved,
it would seem that a lucky single deal with separate money would
yield separate property only. Should the public policy against
lotteries (which the court did not mention) change separate prop-
erty into community property? It would seem not.
If the result were doubtful, the community presumption would
prevail,' but here the mutations principle seems to make the
result clear.
Perhaps the real basis for the holding was a non-recognition
of the controlling importance of the chose in action (the contract
right to the prize if the wife's name were drawn). This perhaps
led to treating the payment of proceeds as being substantially
detached from the earlier purchase of the ticket, and therefore as
15 23 Tex. Jur. 126.
is Lee v. Lee, 247 S. W. 828 (Tex. Com. App. 1923).
1950]
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being community property unless it was in the nature of a gift.
De Funiak points out that such a holding does not give proper
weight to the concept of acquiring property by "onerous title.""7
Such relative non-recognition of the chose is not surprising at
the date of the case (1888); another great judge, in 1901, held
that an insurance policy-today one of the best-recognized choses
-was not property.18
MUTATIONS DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO INTEREST ON NOTES
OWNED BY EITHER SPOUSE
The following discussion will be based entirely on the mutations
principle, ignoring the probable influence of statutes until the
concluding page. The discussion applies to either spouse; the
examples will be based on the wife's separate property.
Suppose that the wife sells her separate chattels (e.g., a herd
of cattle) on credit, receiving a note from the buyer. She no longer
owns the cattle (except doubtless for a lien, which seems not to
alter the situation on principle); she owns a note instead. She has
exchanged her chattels for the contract rights evidenced by the
note; therefore by mutations those contract rights should be her
separate property. What are these contract rights? The right to
be paid the principle and the right to be paid the interest are
the most important. Therefore the contract right to be paid interest
at the specified times would seem to be her separate property.
Since the entire sum and substance of this chose in action is the
right to money, it would be strange to say, when such money is
paid, that it could be anything but the same type of property as
the chose in action. 9 The payment is a sort of mutation, but is
an a fortiori siutation; the payment is really a phase of the con-
tract right, viz., its performance. That is, the wife has sold her
17 1 DE FuNIK op. cit. supra, note 1 at 146 and 148.
18 Martin v. McAllister (Brown, J.) 94 Tex. 567, 63 S. W. 624 (1901) ; Huie, Corn-
munity Property as Applied to Lite Insurance, 17 T .. L. REv. 121, 129 (1939).19 This argument is made as to life insurance (policy and proceeds) in Professor
Huie's excellent article, id. at 122 and 126.
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chattels for a pair of choses in action which ripen into money;
therefore the choses and the money, both principal and interest,
should by mutations be her separate property.
The same reasoning would seem to apply to a sale of the wife's
land. The existence of an express vendor's lien with the accom-
panying superior title, or an implied vendor's lien, would not
seem to change the result; if such temporary retention of legal
title or of a lien has any effect on the problem at hand, it would
seem to strengthen the conclusion reached above. In this situation
several cases have held that interest is separate property.0
Suppose the wife lends her money. At that instant she loses all
title to it; she owns a note instead. She has in effect sold her
money; and the mutations principle should make what she re-
ceived (including the right to interest) her separate property.
The contract to pay interest cannot logically be separated from
the contract to pay principal ;2' both rights are evidenced by the
same note, and arise at the same instant, and both are indispens-
able parts of the price which the wife demanded, and without
either of which she would not have made the bargain. Again,
since the contract right is nothing whatever except a right to
money, that money when paid would certainly seem to be the
same kind of property as the chose in action.
A very different theory, which most of the not very numerous
cases follow and which Judge Speer"3 apparently accepts, places
little or no emphasis on the contract right to interest and entire
emphasis on the payment thereof. This theory treats the interest
money as property acquired during marriage, without attention
to its source, the contract right to interest; and since it was not
acquired by "gift, devise, or descent," it is considered to be com-
20 Scott v. Sloan, 23 S. W. 42, (Tex. Civ. App., 1893).
Carlisle v. Sommers. 61 Tex. 124 (1884).
21 First National Bank v. J. 1. Campbell Co., 114 S. W. 887 (Tex. Civ. App., 1908).
22 See note 19 supra.
23 23 Tx. Jua., Husband and Wile,§ 103.
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munity property.24 The theory also considers interest paid during
marriage as "income" from the wife's separate property, and
therefore community property. This theory is supported by the
economics definition of interest as a payment in return for the
use of money, and by Article 5069's definition of interest as
"compensation for the use or forbearance or detention of money."
Although Article 5069's definition is quite probably controlling
in many situations (this is discussed infra), it is submitted that
both of these definitions are inaccurate legally. If there is a loan,
one of its fundamental elements is the instant passing of title;
the money is not "used" like a bailed chattel. If land or chattels
have been sold in return for notes, no money belongs to the seller
which the buyer holds and uses; any money in the buyer's hands
belongs to him.
This seems to prove that interest, when land or chattels are
s(ild, is not payment for "use or detention" of money; why should
the buyer pay for the use of his own money? Isn't it more realistic
to consider interest as part of the price, which is greater to the
extent of the interest because payment of the price is deferred?
("Compensation for detention of money" probably means addi-
tional pay for the right to delay the main payment; this fits in
exactly with the foregoing argument.) The statement of interest
as a per cent instead of a flat sum is probably due largely to the
obvious fact that the note may not be paid when due-in which
event the specified per cent continues to increase the price, with
substantial fairness.
The argument in the preceding paragraph applies also to a
loan, because title passes and the money belongs to the debtor.
In some fields of law, the pasing of title is relatively unimportant
(e.7., goods in interstate commerce); but there seems to be no
reason here for ignoring this basic, important fact, and the par-
allel to selling land or chattels on credit seems quite exact.
24TEx. CONST. Art. XVI, § 15; TEx. REv. Crv. STAT., (Vernon, 1948) art. 4619;
contra, 1 DE FUNIAK op. cit. supra, note 1 at 146 and 148.
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An interesting analogy is furnished by bailment of fungible
chattels (e. g., wheat). Here the identical wheat need not be re-
turned to the bailor, because of business convenience, just as the
identical money need not be returned to the lender; but here the
analogy ends. The basic difference is, title to the wheat does not
pass: in legal theory, it belongs to the bailor; this is controllingly
important, for the bailee must keep that amount of wheat on hand
and is a converter if he doesn't. On the other hand, title to money
lent passes instantly, and the borrower is free to spend all of it,
because it is his.
The theory that interest is "income" seems unsound on prin-
ciple. Interest cannot be "income" from the property (whether
chattels or land or money) which she no longer owns; it is part
of the sale price of such property. It canont be income from the
principal of the note, as is sometimes thought: that chose in action,
or the cash with which it was paid off, was not used by the wife
to produce income; in fact, the so-called income basically arose
at the same instant as such principal, viz., at the same instant the
note was delivered.
Thus the theory very largely ignores the mutations principle,
ignores the chose in action representing interest with exclusive
emphasis on the money payment, and seems to misapply the con-
cept of "income."
Let us apply the foregoing reasoning to ten fact situations, vary-
ing the dates of the loan of her money (or the sale of other prop-
'erty for notes), the dates of maturity and the dates of payment.
The loan situation will be discussed, instead of notes arising from
sale of land or chattels, because the former seems less clear, as
involving money both initially and in repayment.
The discount situations will not be discussed in detail, but the
results would seem to be the same. For example, suppose that
instead of the borrower's receiving $100 and contracting to repay
$100 plus interest from date, he receives only $95 and contracts
to repay $100 at maturity (the maturity being far enough in the
19501
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future to prevent usury). Once again, the amount repaid is greater
than the amount lent because of the time element: the price is
greater because its payment is deferred. The creditor once again
owns two choses in action (contract right to principal and contract
right to interest after maturity only). The best analysis seems to
be, the interest is paid in advance; this fact does not seem to
change the type of property it is.
Regardless of when her money is lent or her other property is
sold, and regardless of when the notes are due and are paid, the
principal of the notes when paid to her will be held to be her
separate money. Similarly, interest which is both due and paid
before the marriage or after its dissolution, will be her money
and not community property. In all other situations, the nature
of the interest is less clear, with the strong tendency in the cases
to hold it community property, without much analysis.
The ten situations will first be listed and then discussed sepa-
rately (it will be observed that each even-numbered situation is
exactly like the preceding odd number, except that the husband
is the debtor instead of a third party):
1. Wife lends money to a third party during coverture. She receives
notes in return bearing interest from date; these notes mature
during coverture, and are fully paid during coverture.
2. Wife lends money to her husband during coverture. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes mature
during coverture, and are fully paid during coverture.
3. Wife lends money to a third party during coverture. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes mature
after the marriage is dissolved; principal and interest are paid
when due.
4. Wife lends money to her husband during coverture. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these *notes mature
after the marriage is dissolved; principal and interest are paid
when due.
5. Wife lends money to a third party before marriage. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes mature
during marriage; principal and interest are paid when due.
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6. Wife lends money to her husband before marriage. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes mature
during marriage; principal and interest are paid when due.
7. Wife lends money to a third party before marriage. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes become
due before marriage; principal and interest are paid during mar-
riage.
8. Wife lends money to her husband before marriage. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes become
due before marriage; principal and interest are paid during-mar-
riage.
9. Wife lends money to a third party before marriage. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes become
due after marriage is dissolved; principal and interest are paid
when due.
10. Wife lends money to her husband before marriage. She receives notes
in return, bearing interest from date; these notes become due after the
marriage is dissolved; principal and interest are paid when due.
1. Wife lends money to a third party during coverture. She re-
ceives notes in return bearing interest from date; these notes
mature during coverture, and are fully paid during coverture.
Here the wife lends her separate money to a third party. The
notes she receives in return are her separate notes; that is, they
have mutated or changed their form from her separate money
to her separate notes. This transaction would seem to be nothing
more than a "sale" of her sole means in return for the notes,
wherein title to the money passes immediately to the borrower.
These notes are evidence of, and in legal theory embody, two
major choses in action or contract rights (and sometimes some
additional ones of less importance); these are, a right to princi-
pal at maturity and a right to interest whenever due. When the
money is paid, it (interest, as well as principal) should be the
same type of property as the notes which represented it. There-
fore, interest in this situation should be held to be the wife's
separate property.
However, as a general rule the Texas courts have held this
1950)
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interest to be community property. 5 An apparent exception is
where, instead of a loan, there is a sale of land for notes secured
by a vendor's lien, for the cases argue that the principal and in-
terest are inseparable when secured by the same lien (and there
are no coupons representing the interest.)2" The result reached
under this exception seems right, but the reasoning seems un-
sound. Why should the type of security involved change the char-
acter of the whole transaction, since the debt (consisting of the
promises to pay principal and interest) is the basic factor, and
security is merely ancillary thereto?
2. Wife lends money to her husband during coverture. She re-
ceives notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes
mature during coverture, and are fully paid during coverture.
Here the same reasoning should apply, and the interest should
be held to be the wife's separate property.27 Two additional
theories have been urged to produce this same result. First, if the
husband contracts to pay interest on money borrowed from the
wife's separate estate, the irterest could be held the wife's sep-
arate property on the theory of a gift,2" but this theory does not
seem very realistic. Second, in order to produce the result bar-
gained for and to enforce the contract as it was made, interest
must be paid from the husband's separate estate to the wife's sep-
arate estate. If it is paid out of the husband's separate estate to
the community, the wife is getting only one-half of what she bar-
gained for, because of the husband's interest in the community
estate. If interest is paid from the community estate to the wife's
separate estate, again the wife gets only one-half of what she bar.
gained for. If interest is paid from community funds and is held
to be community property, the wife is not getting a penny of the
25 Braden v. Gose, 57 Tex. 37 (1882).
Willcutt v. Willcutt, 278 S. W. 236, (Tex. Civ. App., 1925).
26 See note 20, supra.
27 See 23 TEX. Jun., Husband and Wife, § 62.
28 Engleman v. Deal, 37 S. W. 42, (Tex. Civ. App., 1896), writ of error refused;
23 TEx. Jun. 127.
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interest validly contracted for. This astonishing result was reached
in a recent case.29
This situation seems distinguishable from the usual loan ob-
tained by a married man, where his note is a community obligation
and therefore the money borrowed belongs to the community
estate.29a Here there is an implied (or express) agreement with
the creditor-wife that payment will be made from his separate
estate only; therefore the borrowed money is, as was contemplated,
his separate property.
3. Wife lends money to a third party during coverture. She re-
ceives notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes
mature after the marriage is dissolved; principal and interest
are paid when due.
No cases have been found involving these facts. By the same
initial reasoning, the interest would seem to be, on principle, the
wife's separate property. If the chose in action representing in-
terest is ignored, the interest paid during marriage might be com-
munity property, while interest paid after the marriage ended
would belong entirely to the ex-wife. A more fundamental analysis
would make the chose in action govern, and its nature would be
molded at the inception. If it is separate property (as the muta-
tions principle would indicate), then interest payments during
marriage would likewise be separate property and after the mar-
riage ended would belong entirely to the former wife.
4. Wife lends money to her husband during coverture. She re-
ceives notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes
mature after the marriage is dissolved; principal and interest are
paid when due.
Here again on principle the interest should be held to be the
29 Cadwell v. Dabney, 208 S. W. (2d) 127 (Tex. Civ. App., 1948), writ of error re-
fused. N.R.E.
29a See Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 99 S. W. (2d) 881 (1937) and cases therein
cited.
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wife's separate property (or more accurately, as to interest paid
after the marriage ended, her property). Courts would probably
reach this result, under the same reasoning as in the second situa-
tion supra, when in order to give effect to the husband's contract
as he made it, interest was concluded to be the wife's separate
property.
5. Wife lends money to a third party before marriage. She re-
ceives notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes
mature during marriage; principal and interest are paid when due.
Here the wife lends money to a third party before marriage;
interest paid to her before marriage would obviously belong to
her; and the mutations principle would make the interest paid
during marriage, her separate property. She entered the marriage
owning the notes (i.e., the choses in action represented thereby);
hence interest payments would be her separate property under
the constitution." However, the cases have held that interest here
is community property.8 1
This fifth situation appears to call clearly for a change in the
prevailing rules. Most certainly the notes representing the prin-
cipal and interest are the wife's separate property at the time
of marriage. If interest paid thereafter is held to be community
property, when did the type of property change? Three conceiv-
able opportunities for this change appear: (1) at the instant of
marriage, or (2) at maturity, or (3) at time of payment.
Under the first hypothesis, a chose in action (the contract right
to interest) belonged to the feme sole, but would at the instant
of marriage become a community chose; this is impossible under
the constitution. Under the second hypothesis, the contract right
to interest (clearly the wife's separate chose) would, as each
interest installment matured, become as to the matured right a
community chose; this would be an unjustifiable deprivation of
8o Tmx CoNs'r., supra, note 21.
81 Cruse v. Archer, 153 S. W. 679, (Tex. Civ. App., 1941) but see Commissioner
v. King, 69 F. (2d) 639 (C.C.A. 5th, 1934).
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vested property rights. As to the third hypothesis, there is a super-
ficial basis, viz., the money paid as interest is property acquired
during marriage not by "gift, devise, or descent." The more ac-
curate view seems to be (as discussed supra) that the contract
right is simply and solely a right to money, and therefore when
the money is paid, it is the same type of property as the previous
contract right.
6. Wife lends money to her husband before marriage. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes mature
during marriage; principal and interest are paid when due.
There seem to be no cases on these facts. On principle, the
interest again appears to be the wief's separate property. Interest
paid by the future husband before the marriage would unques-
tionably belong to the feme sole; and after marriage, interest
must be her separate property (and must be paid from his separate
property--discussed supra) if the contract made while both were
single is to be performed as written.
7. Wife lends money to a third party before marriage. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes become
due before marriage; principal and interest are paid during
marriage.
Here the notes mature before the marriage. This is a much
stronger set of facts for holding that interest paid after the mar-
riage is the wife's separate property. Here the right to all interest
(except interest after the note's maturity) has matured before
marriage; the right to the money is complete; all that remains
to be done is the actual payment. Holding that such interest is
community property would have to be based on the blind concep-
tion that the money was property acquired during the marriage
not by "gift, devise, or descent."
8.Wife lends money to her husband before marriage. She receives
notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes become
1950]
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due be/ore marriage; principal and interest are paid during
marriage.
The reasoning in the previous paragraph applies here with full
force, and is further strengthened by the fact that the future hus-
band's already matured obligation cannot be satisfied unless his
interest payments after marriage are the wife's separate property.
9. Wife lends money to a third party before marriage. She re-
ceives notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes be-
come due after marriage is dissolved; principal and interest are
paid when due.
Here the marriage seems to be irrelevant. The wife, being a
feme sole at the time of making the contract and also at the time
of collection, should have an absolute right to the proceeds, both
principal and interest, at the times of collection. Interest paid
before the marriage of course belongs to the feme sole. As to inter-
est paid after the marriage ended, the same result would be ex-
pected. Interest paid during the marriage might be held commu-
nity property but that result would seem superficial and strained
in the extreme.
10. Wife lends money to her husband be/ore marriage. She re-
ceives notes in return, bearing interest from date; these notes
become due after the marriage is dissolved; principal and inter-
est are paid when due.
Here the reasoning of the preceding paragraph applies fully,
with the added factor that the husband's premarital contract cannot
be performed as he wrote it unless all interest payments belong
wholly to the wife.
Thus on principle in all the ten situations discussed, it seems,
quite surprisingly, that interest on notes owned by the wife should
be her separate property. The idea that interest on such notes is
community property doubtless comes from the old Spanish law.
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Also, the presumption of community property, under Article 4619,
is very strong-though it seems rebutted in these situations.
The only statutes bearing on the question seem to be Articles
4616, 4614, 4623 and 5069. Article 4616 indicates backhandedly
that the legislature considered such interest to be community prop-
erty (by including interest in its list of four items of so-called
special community property which are not subject to the husband's
debts and torts.) Whether the statute's language covers all the ten
situations discussed above, is at least open to question. Article
4614 clearly indicates the same legislative understanding (by in-
cluding interest in its definition of the wife's separate property).
The repeal in 1929 of the clause about the wife's interest does not
entirely nullify its influence here. Article 4623 (stating that com-
munity property is not subject to the wife's debts for non-neces-
saries except her earnings and the "income, rents and revenues
from her separate property") was probably intended to include
interest, by the phrase "income from her separate property". The
above analysis indicates that interest is not really "income" from
notes, but Article 5069's definition-that interest is compensation
for use or detention of money-treats interest as income, and very
probably overrides the mutations principle. However, over and
above the old Spanish law and even the cited statutes is the consti-
tution, which states in very broad language: "All property . . . of
the wife owned . .. by her before marriage ... shall be her sepa-
rate property."3"
Applying this definition to notes acquired before marriage, the
contract right to interest would seem clearly to be her separate
property. Therefore, since the money later received should be of
the same character as the chose in action, it is very possible indeed
that holding such interest to be community property, infringes
the constitution.
As to notes acquired after marriage, the mutations principle
32 See footnote 4, supra.
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should produce the result that the chose in action (the wife's con-
tract right to be paid interest) and the subsequent interest pay-
ment are her separate property.
However, mutations is a common law principle, and would very
probably be overriden by contrary statutes, such as Articles
4616 and 5069.
As to interest on the husband's notes, there is no constitutional
definition of his separate property, but Article 4613 defines such
property in language identical (so far as it relates to this problem)
with the constitution's definition of the wife's separate property.
There is no statute relating to interest on his notes except Article
5069's definition of interest. Thus the conclusions of the two im-
mediately preceding paragraphs would probably apply here as to
notes acquired by the husband before marriage. As to notes
acquired after marriage, the mutations principle would suggest
that all interest is separate property, unless Article 5069 and the
frequently asserted policy of treating the spouses alike were held
to override such principle.
It is an admirable feature of the community property system
that all earnings of both spouses belong half and half to the
marital partners. It is perhaps equally praiseworthy (although
two-thirds of the community states have the opposite rule) that
fruits, profits and income from separate property are likewise
shared by both spouses; this rule indicates a generous, whole-
hearted partnership. However, the foregoing principles aggran-
dizing the community estate should certainly not embrace prop-
erty which is really separate. Interest is not the fruit of separate
property; on principle it is separate property.
It is believed that all the foregoing analysis indicates that the
interest problem is not of the open and shut simplicity which is
ordinarily assumed. It is submitted that in future cases involving
the problems herein discussed, the rules applicable should be fur-




OIL AND GAS, TIMBER AND PERENNIAL CROPS
These three topics all have the same characteristic of being a
part of the realty until severance." As to oil and gas, White v.
Blackman"' referred to the
".... settled law of this state that oil and gas in place is a part of the
corpus of the property itself."
Perennial crops which grow spontaneously, without labor or atten-
tion, (e. g., natural grass) are very different in their legal aspects
from annual crops, which require cultivation. The following dis-
cussion will assume that the land under which the oil or gas lie
and on which the timber and perennial crops are growing, is sepa-
rate property of one of the spouses. (Of course, all the results
reached would apply also to gravel, sand, stone, clay, etc.)
Oil and gas in place, standing timber, and unharvested peren-
nial crops could be marketed in three possible ways: (a) by sale
to a third party, who then drills for the oil and gas, cuts the
timber, or harvests the perennial crop; (b) by such action by one
spouse (or both); (c) by such action by an agent (independent
contractor or servant) employed by one or both spouses.
Sale in Place to a Third Party
As to oil and gas, that would be making a so-called lease. Under
the usual form of oil lease, seven-eighths of the oil in place is
granted by way of determinable fee simple, the lessor retaining the
royalty one-eighth, which remains a part of the realty and belongs
to such spouse. When oil is brought to the surface, it becomes a
chattel, one-eighth thereof still belonging to the spouse; when it is
sold to a pipeline company, one-eighth of the cash is by mutations
the spouse's separate property. The usual form of gas lease
33 Garza v. DeMontalvo, 213 S. W. (2d) 762 (1919); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107
Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (1915) ; Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co, 98 Tex. 597, 86 S. W.
740 (1905) ; White v. Blackman, 168 S. W. {2d) 531 (1942) ; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co.
v. Starr, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 353, 55 S. W. 393 (1899).
84 168 S. W. (2d) 531, at 534.




grants all the gas in place to the lessee, who pays therefor with
one-eighth of the proceeds of gas extracted; such cash is by muta-
tions the spouse's separate property. The bonus, if any, paid by
the lessee is part of the purchase price of the minerals, and there-
fore is by mutations separate property of the lessor.8 Delay
rentals, if any, are clearly not exactly parallel to rentals under an
ordinary lease; federal cases have held they are income from the
lessor's land and therefore community property,87 but the point
is possibly unsettled.
Suppose that standing timber is sold to a third party. It was in
legal effect realty before he purchased it; the timber deed effects
a constructive severance. Since he bought realty, the price he paid
is the landowner's separate property, by mutations. The standing
timber and such timber when felled of course belong to the third
party.
Suppose that perennial crops are sold to a third party. The
legal results seem to be exactly parallel to the timber situation;
such crops seem to be separate property and the proceeds are sep-
arate property. However, in Kreisle v. Wilson,8" where natural hay
on the wife's separate property had matured and was ready to cut,
the court held it was community personalty. Judge Speer thinks
that this case is wrong.." How can it be said that mere maturity
is enough to change a perennial crop which is separate property
into community property? Any spontaneous growth of timber,
grass, etc, on separate property remains separate property, for it
is attached to the land and in legal contemplation is (unlike annual
corps in most situations) a part of the land.
No case has been found where a crop requires no annual atten-
tion, but did originally require community labor to set out roots,
86 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson, 76 F. (2d) 766 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935) ;
Ferguson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 45 F. (2d) 573 (C.C.A. 5th, 1930);
Turbeville v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 84 F. (2d) 307 (C.A.A. 5th, 1936).
8T Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson. Ibid.
88 148 S. W. 1132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
8 Note 31. supra.
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plant trees, etc. Such a crop is ordinarily treated as perennial.
Whether it is, before harvested, community or separate property
is not clear; very possibly it is all community property. Which-
ever it is, the proceeds upon sale to a third party (who then har-
vests) should be the same.
Ordinary annual crops, such as cotton or corn, are community
property-apparently before severance as a ramification of the
doctrine of emblements, and certainly after severance. Thus when
sold, the proceeds will by mutations be community property.
As discussed under other topics of this article, the principle of
preserving separate property when sold, through the mutations con-
cept, competes with the principle that the spouses' labor belongs
to the community. Applying these principles here (where there is
a sale of unsevered minerals, timber, or perennial crops to a third
party), the time and attention of one or both spouses required
to effect such a sale of separate property apparently do not prevent
the entire proceeds' being separate property. (Apparently a sale
of such property never results in community property unless there
are multiple sales and purchases amounting to a business.) That
is, such community labor-which is ordinarily not relatively great
or prolonged-does not prevent the full operation of the mutations
principle, whereby separate property becomes separate property
in a changed form. A leading case expresses this result as to oil
and gas as follows:
"Appellant (the wife) had nothing to do with the transaction, and
the only skill exercised or labor performed by appellee (the husband)
was leasing the land and receiving the proceeds for his part of the oil
produced. These facts do not convert his separate into community
property."0
However, as to ordinary annual crops-which as contradistin-
guished from oil and gas, timber, and perennial crops, must be
produced before they can be severed-the amount of community
labor is ordinarily much greater. Such crops are held to be com-
4 oNote 35, supra.
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munity property, apparently even in extreme situations where com-
munity labor is at a minimum and all other elements involved
are separate property of one spouse. A leading case, De Blanc v.
Lynch,"' involved crops where the land was the wife's and the
cultivation was done by her slaves. Apparently the only com-
munity element was the community labor of supervision; yet the
court held the entire crop to be community property, saying:
"If a crop is made by the labor of the wife's slaves on the wife's
land, it is community property, because the law presumes that the hus-
band's skill or care contributed to its production, or that he, in some
way, contributed to the common acquisitions."
If the community supervision was reduced to zero by a five-minute
hiring of a capable farm manager with separate funds, the crop
would be much less clearly community, but even with the commu-
nity element so reduced, the result would very probably be the
same. Crops even with such a slight community tincture seem
within the old Spanish rule that "fruit of separate property" was
community property, in a sense that sand or Johnson grass are not.
Severance by the Spouses
Suppose that one spouse, or both, drill for oil and gas or cut
the timber or harvest the perennial crop. Though there is an im-
mense disparity in the values of the products, the problem seems
essentially the same whre an oil well is drilled as where an acre
of perennial hay is cut. Here the amount of community labor is
vastly greater than in the preceding situation (sale in place to a
third party), and the tendency will be to hold the entire product
to be community property. That result will be somewhat strength-
ened if community money is used; e.g., for equipment. However,
use of community funds would seem to create a mere debt (unless
there was a gift to the spouse owning the land), rather than to
41 23 Tex. 25 (1859).
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have a title-molding effect."2 It is believed that Judge Speer's con-
trary indication' is open to question.
There seem to be only two old Texas cases" on this topic or the
next (severance by an agent). Their value is greatly lessened by
the fact that they involve not only severance of timber and clay,
but also the processing thereof into lumber and bricks-of course
with increased community supervision. Judge Speer, relying heav-
ily on these two cases, says:
"Where, however, the community funds, labor, care or service what-
soever, enter into the acquisition of the new product-that is, the
mineral, timber and the like in its new status as personal property-
it thereby becomes impressed with the community character.... (stat-
ing the two old cases).... From analogy it would seem that timber,
hay, fuel, minerals, soil, gravel, rock, sand, water and the like, found
upon the separate land, when removed therefrom by the husband or
wife, either directly or through the instrumentality of others, and the
proceeds of such things when sold, would likewise belong to the com-
munity."' 5
Judge Hutcheson has quoted that conclusion with approval."
However, with the greatest respect for these eminent authorities,
perhaps the conclusion should be questioned. There seems to be
little justification for holding the entire product to be community
property except the difficulty of tracing and segregating the value
of the separate, unsevered property and the community labor and
funds used to sever it. Such an oversimplified holding would seem
somewhat grotesque in the case of a highly productive oil well.
The fact that the unsevered property was separate should be recog-
nized, on the ground that there is sufficient added utility of form
42 Miller v. Odom, 152 S. W. 1185 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), writ of error refused;
Wehring v. Schumann, 83 S. W. (2d) 1112, (Tex. Civ. App., 1935); Gleich v. Bongio,
128 Tex. 606, 99 S. W. (2d) 881 (1937) ; Goddard v. Reagon, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 272,
28 S. W. 352 (1894).
4s SPEER, LAW or MARITAL RIGHTS pp. 500 and 501 (3rd. ed. 1929).
44 White v. Lynch, 26 Tex. 195 (1862); Craxton, Wood & Co. v. Ryan, 3 Will. Civ.
Cas. App. § 367 (1888).
45 23 TE Jup. 122; also 23 TEx. Jua. 78 and SPEn, op. cit. supra, note 43 at 446.
46 Welder v. Comm. of Internal Revenue, 148 F. (2) 583 (C.CA. 5th, 1945).
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or place to amount to a mutation, or on the persuasive ground
that the severed product is substantially the same property-the
same oil or timber or hay-as while unsevered. In the absence
of proof of the relative values involved, the presumption of com-
munity property would of course make the entire product com-
munity property;47 and Judge Speer considers such proof im-
possible.4" If the values can be proved, a very strong argument can
be made for some sort of allocation between separate and com-
munity estates.
Community property is not defined in the constitution (while
one type of separate property-the wife's-is); and the statute
(Article 4619) defines it as marital property "except that which
is separate property"-which indicates that if the separate prop-
erty can be traced and its value proved, it must not be turned into
community property.
The title could be divided between the separate and community
estates in co-tenancy, or it could all be in one estate with compen-
sation to the other. If title were divided, it would be pro rata,
based on the value of the unsevered item and the value of com-
munity labor (and possibly community funds, though treating
such funds as a debt seems much better.) If the severed product
is worth more than its value when unsevered plus the value of the
community labor and funds (which is likely, for example, as to
timber), some more or less arbitrary allocation of the surplus
value (possibly pro rata) could be made, with perhaps a tendency
to favor the community estate. As to proof of the value of the un-
severed items, such proof could be made as to timber and doubt-
less as to unharvested perennial crops; as to oil and gas in place,
it would be difficult, but should be possible with sufficient accuracy
by using income tax formulae or the methods for evaluating oil
and gas reserves.
The best solution would seem to be, the entire product as sepa-
47 Sp Ri, op. cit. supra, note 43, § 363.
48 23 TEx. JuR. 78.
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rate property, with a right of reimbursement in the community for
the value of its labor and for its funds, probably with a lien or
charge as security. (The exact converse-the entire product to be
community property, with reimbursement of the separate estate-
would theoretically produce the same net result, but this probably
seems to be letting the tail wag the dog.) Such a rule would be
supported by the rather close analogy of improving a separate
estate with community funds, in which case the property remains
separate and the community has a right of reimbursement.49 Such
a rule would appear to do justice whether the values involved were
small or very great.
The situation here seems controllingly similar to sale in place
to a third party, where the community labor did not have a title.
molding effect.
Another community element might be, paying the agent with
community money; that would seem to be mere loan from the
community estate to a separate estate, and ought not to mold the
title to the severed product.
There would be another community element if a servant was
employed; viz., supervision by one spouse or both-which would
not be present if an independent contractor is utilized. (One of the
two old cases50 mentioned under the preceding topic involved
slaves, and therefore doubtless much supervision.)
If the value of the community elements of hiring and supervi-
sion were not proved, the full value of the product would seem
to be community property, on the basis of the familiar presump.
tion. However, it is believed such values could be sufficiently
proved, on the basis of the amount of time spent by the spouse
in hiring and supervising; at worst, the total duration of the
agent's work, multiplied by the per diem value of the spouse's
services, would produce a maximum valuation for the community
elements which would certainly be fair to the community estate.
49 Gandy, Improvement of Marital Property With Funds From Another Estate, 4
SoUTHWESERN L J. 100 (1950)..
50 White v. Lynch, 26 Tex. 195 (1862).
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If such community values were proved, some apportionment
would seem to be equitable. The solutions suggested under the pre-
ceding topic, where a spouse does the necessary work, would
seem to apply here also.
